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The results of Sri Lanka’s parliamentary election on 17 August can be seen as an endorsement of recent
reforms to limit the powers of the executive presidency and strengthen democratic governance. But
Asanga Welikala stresses that the political difficulties ahead must not be underestimated,
particularly the challenge of finding a constitutional settlement that addresses ethnic and religious
pluralism while maintaining the unitary character of the Sri Lankan state.
Sri Lanka concluded its most peaceful and orderly parliamentary election in living memory on 17
August, demonstrating how even a modest de-politicisation of state institutions, together with a
political leadership that broadly respects the rule of law and civic freedoms, can significantly improve the quality of
democracy almost overnight. The election result, which returned the government headed by President Maithripala
Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, can be seen as an endorsement of the constitutional reforms
enacted in April to significantly prune the powers of the executive presidency and strengthen democratic
governance; and a mandate for further reforms to consolidate these and to address minority aspirations to
devolution. Even though several other measures of the government’s 100-day programme were not successfully
enacted, this can be welcomed as an important re-validation of the democratic revolution at the presidential election
in January, which deposed the corrupt and autocratic Rajapaksa regime.
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and his wife, Dr Maitree Wickremesinghe, following his victory. Image credit: facebook/UNPofficialpage
Nonetheless, the political difficulties that confront the next stage of constitutional reforms must not be
underestimated. After all, a constitutional settlement addressing the challenge of ethnic and religious pluralism,
especially, has eluded Sri Lanka throughout its post-colonial history and political opportunities as historic and as
momentous as the present one have been squandered repeatedly in the past. At a similar moment in American
history, Lincoln invoked not only the value and values of magnanimity and charity, but also the need for what he
called ‘firmness in the right’ in striving to ‘finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds.’ If this challenge
is to be met consistently with the democratic promise generated by the two elections of 2015, not only would Sri
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Lanka’s political leaders need to demonstrate an excellence of leadership they have never exercised in the past, but
its civil society would have to continue to play the critical role it did in creating the conditions for the successful
electoral revolution.
After Sirisena won the presidential election in January with the support of the common opposition led by the United
National Party (UNP), he appointed the then Leader of the Opposition Wickremesinghe as the Prime Minister of a
minority government. That government was appointed for the sole purpose of enacting the reforms outlined in the
common opposition’s 100-day programme. In this election, the United National Front for Good Governance led by
the UNP of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe emerged as the single largest party with 106 seats, 7 seats short of an
overall majority in the 225-member Parliament, which is elected through an open list system of proportional
representation. The UNP won 5,098,916 votes or 45.66% of the total vote. On an upward swing of 16.32%, this was
a gain of 46 seats from the last parliamentary election in 2010, where it won 60 seats and 29.34% of total votes.
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won 95 seats, with 4,732,664
votes or 42.38% of the total vote. On a downward swing of 17.95%, the UPFA lost 49 seats from the last election
where it had won 144 seats or 60.33% of the total vote. Sirisena had replaced Rajapaksa as the leader of both the
SLFP and UPFA after the presidential election, but the latter and his loyalists were successful in transforming the
UPFA campaign in the parliamentary election into a Rajapaksa comeback bid. Rajapaksa stood as a parliamentary
candidate (unprecedented for a former President) and the entire UPFA platform was saturated with his regime’s
policies and personalities. Premised on the assumption that the January defeat was a mere aberration, their
strategy was to force Sirisena to appoint Rajapaksa as the Prime Minister after winning a parliamentary majority.
The result is significant therefore not only for the significant decrease in the UPFA vote share across the country, but
also the decline of Rajapaksa’s popularity as an electoral asset that many of his loyalists have traded on for so long.
In the Tamil-majority areas of the north and east the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) swept the poll, increasing their
seats from 14 to 16. The moderates in the TNA successfully withstood a strong challenge from hard-line
nationalists, especially in the Jaffna peninsula where Tamil politics has become the most pluralistic and competitive
in decades, with the relative relaxation of the repressive atmosphere created first by the long dominance of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and then by the militarised post-war administration of the Rajapaksa regime.
There are a number of important implications of this set of results for the reform agenda in the new Parliament. The
Rajapaksa challenge in the south meant that the UNP had to protect a vulnerable flank in the Sinhala-Buddhist
heartland against charges that it would go soft on Tamil nationalists and dissipate the war victory against
secessionism. Consequently, while it promised further devolution in amorphous terms, it had to expressly make a
commitment to maintain the unitary character of the Sri Lankan state. The prima facie implication of this is that any
devolution would be circumscribed by the centralising dictates of the unitary state and that federalism, on which the
TNA won its mandate, is off the agenda. Given that 42.38% of the electorate – the great majority of it in the
dominantly Sinhala-majority districts – voted for the Rajapaksa vision, this would seem to have been a wise
strategic move by the UNP.
However, given that the TNA delivered the northern vote to the common opposition in the presidential election
without which Sirisena would not have won, and saw off the Tamil hard-liners in the parliamentary election, the
government would now have to negotiate with the TNA in finding a constitutional arrangement that satisfies Tamil
aspirations, even if that falls short of full-blown federalism. This will be a difficult challenge, requiring much political
leadership, negotiating skill, and intellectual imagination from both sides, especially in transcending the either/or
terms on which the unitary-federal debate has been conducted so far. And in so doing, the UNP in government will
have a major task in engaging and persuading the sceptical half of the Sinhala electorate that a just and fair
settlement of Tamil grievances is in the broader national interest.
The two elections also evince a deeper political paradox that will underpin – and bedevil – constitutional reform
efforts. Both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe rely on the support of the minorities for their mandates, dictated in part
by Rajapaksa’s strategy of marginalising the minorities and relying solely on Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism. The
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plural basis of the new government’s electoral mandates, drawing support from all ethnic and religious communities,
is therefore a strong incentive for bringing together these communities around a new sense of ‘Sri Lankan’ unity
based on a commonality of shared values and a democratic renewal that all played a part in creating. This is a
powerful force for national unity in a communally plural polity – a civic nation-building moment – that the new
government’s constitution-makers would no doubt seek to harness. And it would be a progressive direction that
would be lauded by the international community and in particular India and the United States, Sri Lanka’s new best
friends, whose own successful nation-states have been built on this model.
Yet the paradox is that building a single sense of Sri Lankan nationhood is inherently a monistic discourse of nation-
state building that will exclude the particular discourse of pluralism that is produced by the Tamil claim to distinct
nationhood and for constitutional accommodation on that specific basis. In other words, even a tolerant and civic
conception of Sri Lankan nation-statehood that makes concessions to internal ethnic and religious diversity,
necessarily precludes any space for multiple nations to be accommodated within the Sri Lankan state. While this
integrating model of liberal ‘Sri Lankan-ness’ will be perfectly adequate for meeting the cultural claims of Muslims
and the even smaller minorities, it is less clear if it could satisfactorily accommodate, at least conceptually, the
Tamils’ more fundamental desire for territorial self-government and to the recognition of their identity as a nation.
This is a much deeper problem than formalistic disputes over descriptive labels such as whether the state ought to
be unitary or federal. It would be a truly extraordinary achievement if Sri Lanka manages to resolve this
constitutional challenge in the forthcoming phase of reform.
The failures of the past should strengthen the resolve of the current constitution-makers, and there is no better
cautionary precedent than the general election of 1970, which mandated the Dominion of Ceylon’s transformation
into the Republic of Sri Lanka. The broad social consensus for the establishment of a republic was hijacked in the
Constituent Assembly by the constitutional agenda of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. By institutionalising the unitary
state and the ‘foremost place’ of Buddhism, and by giving constitutional status only to the Sinhala language, the first
republican constitution registered the Sinhala-Buddhist ownership of the Sri Lankan state. The Tamil federalists, who
had defeated incipient secessionists in the election, found themselves isolated, ignored, and insulted in the
Constituent Assembly. No one even dreamt that within a decade, armed militants would supersede Tamil
parliamentary parties. The authoritarian powers given to the government by the new constitution could never be a
sufficient counterweight to the fundamental illegitimacy of the state that it created. The upshot was a thirty-year civil
war.
Sri Lankans can be justly proud of the depth of their democratic traditions that have enabled them to create another
historic opportunity to re-constitutionalise a better Sri Lankan state. But its political culture remains as ramshackle
as ever, and a dystopian breakdown at any moment never seems too far away. Whether the institutional reforms that
have been passed would be sufficient to rejuvenate the culture of politics and afford the space for less partisanship,
and more reflection and restraint, deliberation and moderation, remains to be seen. Lincoln spoke of the ‘firmness in
the right, as God gives us to see the right’. A lot more than divine inspiration would be needed in firmly pursuing the
right in the Sri Lanka of the present.
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